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Introduction 
H ERE is a piece of contemporary military and political history by the man who played the chief role in the enactment of events it 
describes. 
Less than a year ago, even to some of the best informed people in 
America and Britain, Tito was little more than a mysterious name. 
Today he is one of the most vivid figures to emerge from World War II, 
and the movement he heads is beginning to be understood as having 
not only Yugoslav but wider European significance. 
As leader of a people who know what they want and are ready to 
sacrifice everything to get it, Tito has successfully conducted military 
operations in the face of almost impossible odds, accomplishing more 
with fewer tools of war than any other general, Allied or enemy, in 
this global conflict. At the same time, he developed step by step into 
a statesman of great force and tact, able to offer his complicated and 
hard-pressed country a political and cultural leadership that is both 
wise and shrewd. He became a personal symbol and center of a swiftly 
evolving sitpation: Yugoslavia in the throes of fighting her way clear 
into a better future. 
One explanation of Tito's leadership is that he is an unusually fine 
and well-balanced human being. If he were not that, he would not 
have been accepted by the common people of Yugoslavia. 
Allied officers coming out of embattled Yugoslavia have told about 
Tito in superlatives. He is nothing if not a natural democrat. He is 
personally incapable of becoming a dictator. If he can avoid it at all, 
he does not kill men who oppose him even after they have been 
sentenced to death by the courts of Yugoslav People's Liberation Coun-
cil. Once he is said to have remarked: "One of the easiest things in 
the world is to kill a man." He has come up the hard way. 
Reading this narrative of what happened in Yugoslavia since the 
spring of 1941, one is impressed by the fact that Tito has little to say 
about his own role in the process which he inspired and led. The 
first-person singular pronoun is used only when it cann~t be avoided. 
Then it is used straight-forwardly, matter-of-factly. 
Straight-forwardness and matter-of-factness characterize the whole 
story. From all reports, they have characterized Tito's conduct of the 
military operations and political developments. Through him work 
the compulsions of history. 
For a long time, as already suggested, Tito and his movement were 
ill-understood in America and Britain. No doubt, this narrative was 
written to help remedy that situation. It was written in February, 
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1944, when Major Randolph Churchill, son of the British Prime Min-
ister, arrived in Yugoslavia as his father's personal representative. A 
few months later-in June-Major Churchill said in the course of an 
interview: 
"I was most vividly impressed with the fact that the Partisan move-
ment is very much better organized than I had expected. We had 
heard about the gallant struggle which the Partisans are waging, a 
struggle that has evoked general enthusiasm in England and America. 
But we did not know that the organization was so complete, in par-
ticular the civil administration. What Marshal Tito and the Partisans 
have done should serve as an example to all enslaved peoples of 
Europe. 
"They have perfected the technique of guerilla war in a manner 
rarely ever witnessed before. The way in which, starting from scratch, 
they have built up such a fine army with so excellent an ' organization 
sounds like a beautiful and romantic story. It is this which has 
evoked the great admiration of Americans and Englishmen. 
"I have seen the lands completely ravaged. While traveling here 
from Bosnia, I was horrified when I witnessed the extent to which the 
whole countryside had been ruined. I never dreamed that the ravage 
would be so considerable. Villages burnt and pillaged by the enemy, 
without any struggle. Now I understand with what hardships the 
people and the Army are grappling and how much the population 
has suffered. 
"Wherever I have been, I came across the greatest enthusiasm on 
the part of the people for the national liberation struggle. I was most 
impressed by the way in which the Partisan movement has succeeded 
in uniting all elements which form Yugoslavia. This is the more sig-
nificant, since Yugoslavia is composed of various peoples. 
"The Partisan movement has succeeded in overcoming local fric-
tions and uniting all popular forces of Yugoslavia. This has impressed 
me most deeply. Apart from the splendid successes on the battlefield, 
this is indeed a triumph of statesmanship for Marshal Tito. He has 
succeeded in welding and molding all groups into one whole. 
"In Yugoslava one can see in miniature the new Europe which is 
being born. Just as Partisan warfare should serve as an inspiring 
example to other enslaved peoples, so the political set-up here should 
serve as a model for political construction to the other nations of 
Europe. 
"Marshal Tito has shown himself to be as great a statesman as he 
is a warrior. I am convinced that the principles of tolerance and liber-
alism which are so characteristic of the National Liberation move-
ment will ensure Yugoslavia a happier future." LOUIS AoAMIC. 
Milford, New Jersey, 
August 10, 1944. 
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The Yugoslav Peoples 
Fight to Live 
by ] OSIP BROZ TITO 
T o GIVE the world-deceived as it has been on every side-a clear picture of the real situation in Yugoslavia it is necessary briefly to 
review developments in Yugoslavia before its occupation by the enemy 
and up to the present time. 
In his statement in the House of Commons about Yugoslavia's 
struggle against the invaders Prime Minister Churchill declared "Com-
, munist elements had the honor of being the beginners, but as the 
movement has increased in strength and numbers a modifying and 
unifying process has taken place and national conceptions have super-
vened." These laconic words express a fact which constitutes the pride 
not only of the Communists but of all other patriots among the peoples 
of Yugoslavia. Long before the attack on Yugoslavia-especially after 
the occupation of Austria and despite the fact that they were working 
under the most difficult of conditions because they had been declared 
an illegal group-the Yugoslav Communists constantly warn~d against 
the terrible danger threatening the peoples of Yugoslavia from preda-
tory German fascism. They made every effort to rally all patriotic 
forces of the country to repulse a possible attack on Yugoslavia. Their 
efforts were not in vain. Responding to repeated appeals, the young 
people of Yugoslavia, especially high school students, young workers 
and the students in Belgrade University, prepared to face the hour of 
trial which Hitler's invasion had brought upon the country. 
What was the situation prevailing in the ruling circles of Yugo-
slavia? Both militarily and politically Yugoslavia was in a state of 
chaos. Leading positions on the general military staff were held by 
such traitors in the service of the Germans as General N edich. More-
over Yugoslavia swarmed with German spies who had come as 
"tourists." 
Corruption and embezzlement reigned supreme in all Ministries, 
especially in that of War. Out of a total state budget of 12 billion 
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dinars 4 billions were allocated to war needs. And yet Yugoslavia was 
poorly armed and unprepared to defend itself. Nationality problems-
particularly that of the Croats-became increasingly sharp. The com-
promise reached in the agreement between Machek and Cvetkovich 
actually covered only the sharing of power. It did not by any means 
solve the Croat nationality question. After 1935, with the advent of 
Stoyadinovich to power, the rulers in Belgrade steadily strengthened 
their connections with Axis countries while simultaneously they drifted 
away from their old alliances-for example from the Little Entente, 
and from their alliance with France and other countries. Everything 
was done to isolate Yugoslavia and to weaken her in order to make her 
an easy prey for the German invaders. 
Yugoslavia was almost the only country in Europe whose rulers 
for twenty years ignored the people's demands that diplomatic rela-
tions be established with the Soviet Union. Recognition came only 
when the German invaders were loudly knocking on Yugoslavia's door. 
March 27, 1941 will go down in the history of our people as one 
of our most memorable dates. Following the shameful signing of the 
"Tripartite Pact" and Yugoslavia's adherence to the Axis the regime 
of the traitor Prince Paul-in which Cvetkovich and Machek played 
the leading roles-was overthrown. Monster demonstrations through-
out Yugoslavia, particularly in Belgrade, showed that the peoples of 
Yugoslavia preferred to make the greatest of sacrifices rather than 
become Axis slaves and see the glorious traditions of their ancestors 
betrayed. 
But the new Simovich Government which succeeded the Cvetkovich 
Government proved unequal to its task because it failed to estimate 
the strength of the peoples correctly or to rely upon it. Furthermore 
it left intact the old corrupt state apparatus which was not only 
incompetent but openly sabotaged all measures necessary for the 
country's defense. 
The ten days during which the invaders defeated our country con-
stitute the most shameful period in its history. They brought out in 
bold relief all the rottenness, all the treachery hitherto covered up 
artificially. Were the peoples of Yugoslavia really willing to defend 
their country? Yes, they were. As soon as mobilization was announced, 
peasants, workers, young people and honest intellectuals rallied to the 
colors. Replying to a special summons from the leadership of the 
Communist party all party members fit for military service hastened 
to enroll. But this fighting ardor was in vain, for the politicians and 
the military leadership had betrayed the country. Volunteers were 
shifted from one recruiting station to another. Incorrect orders were 
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given to troop trains. Soldiers were dispatched to the front without 
ammunition. When matters had ,reached the point of surrender the 
commanding general and other high-ranking officers ordered their 
soldiers-under threat of shooting-to lay down their arms. In hun-
dreds of cases the soldiers refused to carry out these commands. 
Yet entire divisions and armies surrendered to the Germans almost 
without a struggle and the men were driven off into German slavery. 
General Milan Nedich (the Serbian Quisling who forced his units, 
to their certain doom, to face German tanks without any anti-tank 
weapons) was one of the first officers to surrender his army to the 
Germans. Seeing this vile treachery, soldiers burst into tears of indig-
nation and wherever they succeeded in escaping from the grip of the 
German troops of occupation they left for their homes, uttering 
imprecations. 
Thereupon the most horrible days in the history of our peoples 
set in. The Croats were mercilessly tortured by the U stashi, headed 
by the criminal Croatian Quisling, Dr. Ante Pavelich, a creature of 
Mussolini and Hitler, who came to power in Croatia. A mass slaughter 
of Serbs was launched in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Slavonia, Vojvodina 
and elsewhere. Unfortunate peasants in these regions, together with 
their families, sought safety in the forests. But the Ustashi and the 
Germans savagely hunted these refugees down and destroyed them 
wherever they succeeded in locating them. The same terrible fate was 
suffered by all honest progressives in the country. Gradually people 
throughout Serbia began to offer resistance-at first unorganized-
fighting for their lives with every means at their disposal. The same 
situation prevailed in Slovenia, where Germans and Hungarians began 
the destruction of entire villages, shipping tens of thousands of towns-
men and peasants off to work in Germany. 
The Resistance Takes Its First Steps 
T HE leadership of the Communist party took every possible step to organize a popular uprising. As early as the autumn of 1940, and 
in strict secrecy, a so-called Military Committee had been set up. This 
Committee was charged with the task of fostering a spirit of resistance 
among sol,diers and officers of the Yugoslav Army in case of foreign 
attack and with taking over military leadership if the country should 
surrender. After the April surrender this Committee was broadened 
and became known as General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detach-
ments of Yugoslavia. Later this was reorganized into the High Com-
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mand. Immediately following the surrender of Yugoslavia and the 
mass extermination of the Serb population in Croatia and Bosnia the 
Communist party sent its members to organize the refugees in the 
forest into guerrilla detachments. 
Prior to the attack of the Hitlerite ho~des against the Soviet Union, 
leaders of the Communist party in Yugoslavia had concluded an 
agreement with Dragoljub Jovanovich, leader of the Serbian Agrarian 
party, and with a group led by Dr. Ivan Ribar. On June 22, when 
the German armies suddenly invaded Russia, the leaders of the Yugo-
slav Communist party held an urgent meeting with the Military 
Committee at which it was decided to start revolts throughout Yugo-
slavia. 
The men present also decided to rename the Military Committee 
the General Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugo-
slavia and to place it in charge of operations throughout the country. 
This headquarters dispatched members to various provinces to super-
vise the organization of guerrilla detachments and to conduct opera-
tions. Moreover territorial units were organized to wreck telephone 
and telegraph communications and to attack stores and other military 
objectives. During that period the youth of Belgrade displayed a 
heroism which will constitute the pride of our peoples for many 
generations to come. In broad daylight young girls and lads of fourteen 
attacked German trucks, poured kerosene on them and destroyed 
them. Defying the gallows set up in Terasia Square, Belgrade, high 
schools and university students and young workers carried out acts of 
sabotage with mounting vigor. 
Whereas, before the attack on the Soviet Union, the only joint 
struggle (outside the cities) had been carried on in certain parts of the 
Bosnian and Hercegovinian mountains the guerilla movement rapidly 
spread across the rest of the country after the Soviet Union had been 
invaded. By July 1941 the Valjevo, Kragujevac, Uzice, Homolj and 
• other guerrilla detachments were already making forays against the 
enemy. Operating in groups of twenty to thirty men, armed with one 
or two rifles and a few bombs they attacked small German groups and 
procured arms from the Germans whom they killed. 
Growth of the Guerrilla Movement 
W HILE the guerrilla movement grew and acquired a mass character in Serbia, a general uprising of the people under the leadership 
of the Communists had already been organized in Montenegro by 
July 13, 1941. At a given signal ten thousand Montenegrins attacked 
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Italian garrisons throughout Montenegro, occupied all towns with the 
exception of Cetinje and Podgorica, took some six thousand Italian 
soldiers and officers prisoner and captured rich booty. 
Montenegrin patriots had begun their hard and bloody struggle 
against the several Italian divisions Mussolini had sent to suppress 
the revolt. 
By August 1941 guerrilla detachments in Serbia had liberated 
Posavina as fat as Obrenovac, hearly all of Macva, and had occupied 
the towns of Lajkovac, Jabljik, Krupanj, Loznica and Stolac. Early 
in September they captured Uzice, Cacak, Uzicka-Pozega, Gornji-
Milanovac and other small localities. Thus, guerrillas liberated almost 
all of Western Serbia and a considerable part of Eastern Serbia. 
Under the extremely difficult conditions which prevailed in August 
the Headquarters for the Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia were 
moved from Belgrade to the small town of Krupanj and, later, to 
Uzice. At the beginning of September 1941 the first military conference 
was held in the Stolac mine, near Krupanj. 
Notwithstanding all obstacles, delegates from Slovenia, Croatia, 
Serbia, Bosnia and other regions were present. The conference arrived 
at far-reaching and important decisions. The principal headquarters 
were renamed High Command for the GuerrillC\ Detachments of 
Yugoslavia; and divisional headquarters were set up for Slovenia, 
Croatia, Bosnia and Montenegro (with commanders who were also 
members of the High Command). In addition to arriving at purely 
military decisions (such as, for example, the decision to collaborate 
with all other forces which had not sold themselves to the invaders) 
the conference adopted the Belgrade plan for clearing Western Serbia 
and mapped out a scheme for the conduct of military operations and 
for the establishment of bases in all other parts of Yugoslavia. 
Although the principal headquarters for the guerrilla detachments 
were still located in Belgade it was learned that Colonel Draja Mihailo-
vich was hiding somewhere in the mountains of Ravna Gora with a 
group of officers who sought to escape capture by the enemy. Up to 
that moment Mihailovich had not fought in a single battle and 
Bosnian peasants who rebelled to defend their lives had never been 
under his command. As long ago as July, 1941, I personally left 
instructions at the headquarters of the Valjevo guerrilla detachment 
to establish contact with l\,f;hailovich and induce him to agree to 
collaborate with us in a joint struggle. 
But he categorically refused to make any move against the Ger-
mans-first because he had no armed forces whatever at his command 
and, second, because he feared reprisals. Our headquarters came into 
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possession of an interesting document. Through this document a 
member of the Mihailovich group who is close to us informed us that 
Mihailovich was about to send to Bosnia some insubordinate officers 
who wanted to fight the invader. Among them was lieutenant Ratko 
Martinovich who along with a priest, Vlado Zechevich, had collab-
orated with us from the very earliest days of the, German occupation, 
organizing detachments of Chetniks in the Krupanj areas. This docu-
ment further revealed that Mihailovich had decided to kill Martino-
vich (with the aid of a criminal) when the latter crossed the Drina. 
My Meeting w~th Mihailovich 
• I MMEDIATELY upon my arrival in liberated territory in August 1941 I went to see Mihailovich in Ravna Gora. He received me in 
Vojvoda Mishich's house in the village of Struganik instead of in his 
own eyrie of Ravna Gora. Also present at the meeting were Major 
Mishich and the notorious advocate of a greater Serbia, Dragisha 
Vasich. These conversations yielded poor results. Saying that the 
time was not yet ripe and advancing other excuses Mihailovich stub-
bornly refused to begin to war on the Germans. At that time he 
already commanded some detachments of Chetniks whom his officers 
had organized in territory liberated by the guerrillas in Western 
Serbia. We got no further than to reach a verbal agreement that 
Mihailovich's Chetniks would maintain a loyal attitude toward the 
guerrillas and wouldn't attack them. Vojvoda Pechanat's Chetniks did. 
Since for some unknown reason Mihailovich mistook me for a 
Russian and remained under that impression for some time, he spoke 
openly about the Croats and the other peoples of Yugoslavia. Asked 
his opinion of the national problem, he openly declared that Croats, 
Moslems and others must be mercilessly punished and that, after 
retribution had been exacted, they must be completely subordinated 
to the Serbs. 
When I objected he replied that this program was fully justified 
inasmuch as all Croats were responsible for the Ustashi atrocities and 
that all who had sold out Yugoslavia to the Germans were Ustashi 
and traitors. In conclusion Draja promised to think it over and 
inform me how and when his units would begin the struggle. 
In September our guerrilla forces, together with one detachment 
led by Rachich, besieged and attacked Sabac. Rachich also won 
Mihailovich's disfavor at that time for joining us in the struggle. The 
attack didn't succeed. Germans quickly brought up two of their 
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divisions, two or three Croat regiments and several units from 
Ljotich's Serbian fascist movement and began their first offensive-
one which, with interruptions, lasted until the end of November. 
Fighting was most violent in Macva, Cer, Porcerina, in the J adar 
Valley and in Cavlak. Our units slowly retreated, stubbornly defend-
ing every inch of ground. 
Before the German offensive was launched it was decided that 
peasants from Macva should transfer as large stocks of grain as possible 
to highlands near Krupanj and Sokolska Plan ina. Thousands upon 
thousands of peasant carts moved in the direction of the mountains. 
Constantly shelled by German bombers the peasants sought safety in 
the forests. The Germans succeeded in occupying Loznica and the 
area stretching up to the Jadar Valley. But with almost no anti-tank 
weapons our men succeeded in destroying 20 German tanks. More 
than 1,000 enemy soldiers fell in these battles and an additional 600 
were taken prisoners. Having encountered very strong resistance and 
suffered heavy losses, the Germans didn't dare to continue the offensive 
in the highlands and began energetic preparations for offensive opera-
tions on a wide front, from Kraljevo in the direction of Valjevo up 
to the Drina River. Our guerrilla detachments again launched a 
counteroffensive and recaptured the greater part of Macva and Posa-
vina, while the biggest guerrilla detachment-the Valjevo detach-
ment-completely encircled the German garrison in Valjevo. 
Jointly with Mihailovich's Chetniks our units also encircled the 
town of Kral jevo and with the aid of heavy artillery and tanks broke 
into the town. As early as October some 1,200 of Mihailovich's Chet-
niks participated jointly with our units in the military operations at 
Kraljevo and Valjevo. This was accomplished because at the time of 
the offensive against us I sent a letter to Mihailovich from Krupanj 
indicating the danger that would result from our loss of the liberated 
territory. Mihailovich agreed and his units fought with us from 
October until November 1941. But even during this brief period of 
joint action the Chetniks under the command of Major Mishich fled 
to Valjevo from the battlefields after the first serious clashes with the 
Germans, leaving guerrilla units to fight alone. After our guerrilla 
units had liberated Cacak, Uzicka-Pozega and Gornji-Milanovac, 
Mihailovich's officers began an energetic mobilization of the peasantry 
in our liberated territory in the name of the King and under the 
slogan, "Those who join the Chetniks will remain in their homes 
while those who join the guerrillas will forfeit their lives in unequal 
battles at the front." Although the guerrillas freed Western Serbia, 
the Chetnik command was granted permission to organize its units in 
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liberated territory and to organize joint local Chetnik and guerrilla 
squads in Cacak, Uzice, Gornji-Milanovac and other towns. 
During the liberation of Uzice we captured rich military prizes-
for example 100 motor vehicles, an arsenal, a tannery, a branch of the 
People's Bank with some 55 million dinars in cash, etc. Our own 
growing arsenal produced 150 rifles and 40,000 to 50,000 cartridges 
daily (which we succeeded in stepping up to 420 rifles and 80,000 
cartridges daily). 
The successes achieved by our guerrillas evoked alarm among the 
Germans and N edich's men on the one hand and envy on the part 
of Mihailovich and his officers on the other. Even at that time, October 
1941, they were secretly preparing to attack us with the object of 
wresting U zice from us. 
Nedich kept on sending more and more of his agents into the 
ranks of Mihailovich's Chetniks and these agents engaged in systematic 
provocation to produce an open clash between the guerrillas and the 
Mihailovich Chetniks. Capturing Uzicka-Pozega, they constantly 
harassed our railway communications at Cacak and Cornji-Milanovac 
and provoked clashes with us. 
I Visit the Chetniks Again 
O UR High Command did its utmost to avert such clashes and through Mitich, liaison staff officer, again proposed to Mihailo-
vich that he negotiate an agreement. It was suggested to Mihailovich 
that negotiations be conducted in a neutral zone, near the township 
of Kosoric, but he constantly sought to evade them. After this I again 
went to Ravna Gora, accompanied by two members of the High Com-
mand, Sreten Zhujevich and Mitar Bakich. The draft proposal which 
I prepared covered ten points; but during the negotiations in the 
village of Brajici, near Ravna Cora (in the presence of some ten 
officers from Mihailovich's staff), we failed to reach an agreement on 
the most important point-the matter of the joint command. We had 
proposed the formation of joint administrations based on the principle 
of the People's Liberation Committee. Agreement was most easily 
achieved on the matter of dividing deposits in the People's Bank and 
armaments produced by the Uzice arsenal and on the question of 
military commandants in the towns. On the day following negotiations 
we immediately handed over to Mihailovich 500 new rifles and 25,000 
cartridges from our arsenal. It is noteworthy that Mihailovich rejected 
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my proposal that the British Captain Hudson, who was in the ad-
joining room, participate in the discussions. 
On the fourth day after the negotiations Draja Mihailovich's 
Chetniks attacked us at Dzicka-Posega with the very same rifles and 
cartridges they had received from us. And at Dzicka-Pozega, after this 
clash, Blagojevich, commander of our Sumadja detachment who was 
returning from headquarters, was forced off his train and brutally 
murdered by Captain Glishich's men. Captain Glishich himself acted 
under Mihailovich's orders. 
Because I was totally unaware of Blagojevich's fate, I sent a most 
vigorous protest. to Mihailovich's headquarters demanding that the 
commander be set free immediately. The reply came that nothing was 
known about the arrest of the person named. At the same time we 
came into possession of important documents from the Chetnik local 
comfnand in Kremnja instructing all mobilized Chetniks to report on 
November 2 at 5:00 A.M. at the forest ten kilometers from Dzice. 
At once it became clear to us that Mihailovich was preparing an 
armed attack on Dzice. 
Our conclusion was confirmed by the fact that Mihailovich removed 
800 of his Chetniks from Kraljevo, with the object (as we later learned) 
of delivering an attack at Cacak. These Chetniks not only opened the 
road to Kraljevo to the Germans; by deception (and for use in their 
own attack at Cacak) they deprived our units along this front of 
several heavy guns and a couple of tanks. We in turn were obliged to 
withdraw one of our units from the front at Valjevo to defend Dzice 
and Cacak. But subsequent events have clearly revealed that this 
attack was planned in agreement with N edich, and even with the 
Germans, to time it with the German attack before Kraljevo and up 
the slopes of Turina. 
We Must War on the Traitors 
A WARE of the exact movements of the Chetnik units in the direction of Uzice, we ordered our troops to deliver a counterattack on 
November 2 at 4 A.M. Eight kilometers from Dzice, at the intersection 
of three roads (Uzicka-Pozega, Uzice and Kosoric) our units met 800 
Chetniks and, after a few hours of fighting, completely crushed them. 
Several hundred Chetniks, including their commander, were killed. 
We then issued orders for a general attack on Uzicka-Pozega, the 
Chetniks' principal base. After an extremely bloody battle which 
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lasted all day our units occupied Uzicka-Pozega and rapidly began to 
press the Chetniks toward Ravna Gora. 
Our units enveloped Ravna Gora from three sides-from the direc-
tions of Cacak, Gornji-Milanovac and Uzicka-Pozega. Seeing that he 
was encircled, Mihailovich urgently dispatched liaison-officer Mitich 
to our headquarters imploring us to stop this bloody struggle. 
Although the guerrilla troops were animated by bitter hatred for 
the Chetniks and wanted to put an end to this treacherous gang as 
soon as possible, I agreed to stop the struggle on the following con:' 
ditions: 
1. Immediate withdrawal of Chetnik units to the Kameni-Cabrajic 
line. 
2. Immediate formation of a joint commission to investigate the 
Uzicka-Pozega incident and other crimes. 
3. Immediate formation of a commission to carry out final nego-
tiations. 
The Negotiations Commission met in Cacak but it was impossible 
to arrive at an agreement because Germans had succeeded in punc-
turing our front at Valjevo and Kraljevo and with the help of sup-
porting tanks were rapidly advancing. Extremely violent and bloody 
fighting against the Germans developed all along the sector from 
Kraljevo to Drina. At that time Mihailovichs Chetniks were openly 
collaborating with the Germans. One night at Gornji-Milanovac, for 
example, they deceived three hundred guerrillas, disarmed them, 
stripped them of their clothing in Ravno Gora and, after subjecting 
them to the most savage torture, dispatched them naked on a bitterly 
cold night to the Germans in Val jevo. Almost all of these heroes were 
brutally murdered by the Germans. At Mionica the Chetniks seized 
seventeen nurses and a doctor, brutally murdered them and reported 
(their "heroic" deed to the Germans. From that time on, close collab-
oration was established between Mihailovich's Chetniks and the Ger-
man forces. 
Throughout almost the whole of November our guerrilla fighters 
rebuffed the superior forces of the Germans and Nedich's men. The 
most violent battles were fought at the Valjevo sector near Vukovik, 
in the Packi-Kupanj and Loznica sectors in Gornji-Milanovac and in 
the Kraljevo sector. 
In this campaign the Germans used strong infantry forces, tanks 
and aircraft. Losses on both sides were very heavy. By November 25 
the Germans succeeded in capturing U zice and Cacak. The main body 
of our own forces retreated in the direction of Zlatibor and Ivanica 
and the last principal engagements were fought to the river Ujac 
between Sandjak and Serbia. 
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The greater part of the guerrilla forces filtered back in small detach-
ments to the interior of Serbia, however, and from there continued 
their heroic struggle against the invaders and their henchmen. Out of 
the remainder were created our amazing First and Second Serbian 
Brigades-brigades which, together with Montenegrin brigades, have 
twice retraced a glorious path from Montenegro to Bosanska-Krajina. 
From July 1941 on-while these events were taking place in Serbia 
and while the men and women of Serbia were engaged in a superhuman 
struggle against the invaders and domestic traitors-ceaseless fighting 
was in progress in Montenegro against the Italian invaders also. In 
December some 3,500 Montenegrin guerrillas attacked Plevlje, a 
strongly fortified town in Sandjak, held by an entire Italian division. 
With sweeping assaults our units broke through and in the course 
of violent fighting occupied a considerable section of the town. Some 
2,000 Italian soldiers perished in the street fighting. But after two 
days of battle our units were obliged to withdraw from the town, for 
without heavy weapons they were unable to seize the fortifications 
from which the enemy artillery was constantly shelling the town. We 
too suffered heavily in this engagement. 
Battles for Bosnia 
SEVERE battles continued in Bosnia, particularly in Rogatica and Zvornik, and by October almost all of East Bosnia (including the 
towns of Rogatica, Vlasenica, Han-Pijesak and Srebrenica) had been 
cleared. Our troops were at the gates of Sarajevo, Romanija and 
Stambolchik. In Lika and at Kordun our troops likewise liberated 
much terirtory. In Bosanska-Krajina our troops had already occupied 
Drvar and a number of other localities during August. Here the 
fighting against Italians and U stashi became very violent. And here 
too, even that early in the war, the Chetniks stabbed our units in the 
back. That period marked the beginning of the glorious and epic 
Kozara fighting which will forever remain the most brilliant page in 
the annals of our struggle. There were also severe clashes at Petrova 
Cora where the enemy undertook a number of violent offensive oper-
ations. 
Action on a smaller scale began in the autumn in a number of other 
points in Croatia and Slovenia. Sabotage had gone on there con-
tinuously, however, from the very beginning . .s\fter our withdrawal 
from Serbia we occupied Nova Varos where our units had a chance 
for a respite. Then the High Command, with one unit of Serbian 
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troops, started out in the direction of East Bosnia. En route they 
occupied the town of Rudo, where the first Serbian brigade was 
formed. (On the very day after its formation this brigade smashed 
three columns of Italians combined with Mihailovich's Chetniks who 
were advancing in the direction of Rudo.) 
At about that time the position of the guerrilla movement in East 
Bosnia became very critical. Thus far friendly collaboration between 
guerrillas and Chetniks had been maintained in that part of the 
country. After the guerrillas had chalked up important successes in 
East Bosnia, however, officers sent in by Draja Mihailovich began to 
wreck the movement until gradually the elements which favored 
cessation of hostilities against the Germans and advocated warfare 
on the guerrillas gained the upper hand. 
In East Bosnia Major Dangich and Major Todorovich were Mihail-
ovich's chief deputies. Major Dangich was at that time in contact 
with the Germans and launched attacks against guerrilla detachments 
with the object of disarming them. Partly under the influence of the 
demoralizing propaganda of these officers, and partly under the compul-
sion of threats, peasants began to desert the guerrillas, going over to the 
Chetniks or returning to their homes. But the appearance of the First 
Serbian Brigade in Eastern Bosnia produced a radical change in the 
situation. As a strong unit, fit and disciplined, it rapidly acquired influ-
enCe by virtue of its successes against the enemy and arrested the disin-
tegration of guerrilla detachments. Those guerrillas who had gone over 
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to the Chetniks returned to the fold, realizing that they had been misled 
by the lying propaganda which alleged that the guerrillas had been 
destroyed in Serbia. It is noteworthy, therefore, that in East Bosnia 
guerrilla detachments joined our First Serbian Brigade in the fighting 
which took place in December at Varos and Romanija. 
Germans Launch a Second Offensive 
H ARDL Y had the guerrilla forces in East Bosnia reconsolidated their ranks when the Germans launched a second offensive from four 
directions: from Zvornik, from Visegrad, from Sarajevo (along the 
Visegrad r~ilway line) and from Sarajevo through Romanija. In~o 
this campaign they threw strong German forces supported by Ustashi 
conscripts (Pavelich's regular units) and Chetniks. And before the 
offensive got upder way the Chetnik headquarters in East Bosnia (with 
Todorovich and Dangich in command) issued strict orders to the 
Chetniks not to fire a single shot against the Germans. Instead the 
Chetniks were either to hide or to help the Germans. 
Bitter cold and heavy snow hampered our forces in these battles. 
In view of the shortage of ammunition our troops were obliged to 
abandon Rogatica, Vlasenica and other places after five days of fighting. 
Carrying out a skillful maneuver the Bosnian guerrilla detachments 
again attacked the enemy from the rear. In the meantime our Serbian 
Brigade was divided into two parts. One of these retreated with the 
High Command via Glasinac to Mount J ahorina. The other, accom-
panied by the Brigade's staff, made a number of astonishing marches 
and reached Foca by moving past Sarajevo through the Sarajevo Valley. 
During this march, one of the most difficult in the war, with the 
thermometer dropping to below 25 degrees centigrade, about 160 
men suffered frostbite and many had to have their legs amputated. 
The first column, jointly with the High Command, succeeded in 
checking the Germans and Ustashi on Mount Jahorina; and those 
Chetnik defenders of the sector who had been abandoned by their 
officers were placed under our command. A few days later Monte-
negrin troops and a battalion from the First Brigade occupied Foca, 
Gorazde and Cajnice. Thus a base was again secured, not only for 
rest and reorganization of units but also for mobilizing new reserves 
of man power. 
February, March and half of April were utilized for restoring 
order and regrouping those Chetnik units-more than 10,000 strong-
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which, disappointed in Chetnik leadership, had joined our command. 
Thus, in addition to the guerrilla detachments, so-called volunteer 
units were formed and the High Command changed its name to High 
Command of the People's Liberation Guerrilla and Volunteer De-
tachments. Throughou.t the winter and up to the middle of April 
1942 (when the enemy embarked upon his third offensive) our guerrilla 
and volunteer units were engaged in very severe fighting in the .la-
horina-Romanija sector; around Rogatice, which was encircled; at ' 
Kalinovnik, where the Italian garrison was likewise encircled; and 
especially in Montenegro, in the Kolasin-Sinjajevina and Niksic· 
Grahovo sectors. At that time our Serbian troops occupying the Pri je-
polje Nova-Varos sector reached Cajnice. There the First and Second 
Serbian Brigades were assigned the task of advancing toward Vlasenica 
to clear that territory of the Chetnik gangs led by Dangich and Rachicb 
who were openly collaborating with the Germans. After a rapid ad-
vance our brigades reached Vlasenica and Srebrenica, where they 
completely smashed the Dangich units and hurled them across the 
Drina River into Serbia. En route the second Serbian Brigade com-
pletely destroyed the Chetnik staff in the Rogatica sector, near Borici. 
This advance through deep snowdrifts around the highest moun-
tain peak, Denetak, was brilliantly carried through by our troops. 
When in April 1942 it became clearly evident that the Germans, Ital-
ians and Ustashi were preparing for their third offensive, both brigades 
received urgent orders to return to the Gorazde Cajnice sector. 
As I have already mentioned, very heavy engagements were in 
progress in Montenegro at this time-not only against the Italian 
invaders but also against the Chetniks under Mihailovich and Major 
Djurichich. How did matters come to such a pass? 
Following the general popular uprising in July 1941 the greater 
part of Montenegro had been liberated. Numerous guerrila detach-
ments there attacked the forces of occupation constantly, menacing 
their communications. N iksic was encircled and the Italian invaders 
suffered tremendous losses in men and equipment. The Italians, who 
did their utmost to discover traitors among the Montenegrins, found 
them in the persons of Baja Stanishich and Major Djurichich. Moreover 
Draja Mihailovich sent a group of his officers to Montenegro in an effort 
to break the unity of the Montenegrins by creating detachments of 
Chetniks there. At that time Baja Stanishich still maintained contact 
with our general headquarters in Montenegro. Taking advantage of 
this fact, he secretaly created his own organizations within the 
guerrila detachments and thus succeeded in bringing a considerable 
number of guerrillas under his influence and transforming them into 
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Chetniks. His putsch occurred suddenly. Baja Stanishich, with a group 
of his guerrillas, split away and went over to the forces of occupation. 
In Vasojevici, Djurichich succeeded in mobilizing fairly strong forces 
and equipped them with Italian arms. Throughout February, March 
and almost the whole of April, and under the most difficult conditions, 
our Montenegrin guerrilla units fought the combined forces of Italians 
and domestic traitors. Therefore, when the enemy launched his third 
offensive, a considerable portion of our Montenegrin units were obliged 
to withdraw from Montenegro, fighting only rearguard actions. 
The Third Offensive 
T HE third enemy offensive was thoroughly prepared and was con-ducted with almost all of the Italian and German forces, plus 
the Ustashi and Chetniks. Beginning in Bosnia and Montenegro, this 
offensive later spread to Slovenia, Dalmatia and Kozara. While the 
Italian Pusteria Division, as well as several Chetnik detachments from 
Serbia, were concentrated at Plevlje, two other Italian divisions were 
concentrated at N iksic, Podgorica and Kolasin. Another division was 
located in Hercegovina, near Gacko and Nevesinje. In addition to the 
Germans 30,000 Italian soldiers were concentrated in the Sarajevo 
Valley. 'Vhile the Germans advanced on Trnov and from Sarajevo 
Kalinovnik, other enemy forces advanced from Plevlje toward Cajnice 
and Foca. In Romanija, Germans and Ustashi were advancing toward 
Rogatica from Gorazde. Beginning about the middle of March these 
battles continued until June 20. In the face of superior enemy forces 
our troops gradually withdrew from Bosnia in the general direction 
of l'vlontenegro. In the middle of May 1942, when the enemy occupied 
Foca, our troops began to retreat from Mount Sinjajevino and Niksic, 
across Durmitor, toward Pivska Planina and Hercegovina. The severest 
fighting during this offensive took place on the Goransko-Gacko sector. 
Strong Italian forces and Chetniks exerted pressure from three direc-
tions. To save our units from encirclement at Pivska Planina the High 
Command issued orders to retreat via Planina Volujak and Magljic 
toward the river Suteska and swiftly transferred our best units-the 
First and Second Serbian Brigades-to the Gacko sector and to the 
country around Golija to stem the rapid advance of the Italians who 
(with the object of cutting our retreat) were driving toward Gacko, 
Cemerna and the upper reaches of the Suteska River. These units 
handled their job splendidly although it involved severe losses. A 
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strong force of heavy ar-
tillery concentrated at 
Gacko shelled our trans-
ports of the wounded 
who were being evacu-
ated from Montenegro. 
But after several very bit-
ter battles at the apex of 
the Hercegovina, Mon-
tenegro and Bosnia tri-
angle all of our units, to-
gether with the wounded, 
reached the Tentiste-
Kalinovnik sector. There, 
Montenegrin and Sand-
jak guerrilla detachments 
were regrouped into one 
Sandjak, one Hercegovinian and two Montenegrin shock brigades. 
This was the end of the third ene.'11Y offensiye in this most important 
sector. 
Our Counteroffensive 
T HE Germans, who lacked adequate strength to continue the struggle in this area, concentrated their main forces against our 
heroic town of Kozara. Extremely severe battles ensued. The German 
objectiv~ was to destroy the uprisihgs centered in Bosanska-Krajina. 
The Italians were likewise unable to keep up the battle in this sector 
because it became urgently necessary for them to reinforce their units 
in Dalmatia and Slovenia since the popular uprisings had reached such 
proportions, especially in Slovenia where a sizable portion of the area 
had been liberated, that the enemy's most important communications 
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were menaced. Moreover the enemy expected our forces on this sector 
to be so worn down by hunger and battle losses as to be unfit for major 
operations for some time. We left a few small guerrilla detachments 
in Montenegro, the Sixth Bosnian Shock Brigade and several guerrilla 
detachments in East Bosnia and a Montenegrin and a Hercegovinian 
brigade in the Tentiste-Kalinovnik sector to protect our hospitals and 
to conduct minor operations. The High Command decided to march 
with the remaining units of the First and Second Serbian, Third 
Sandjak and Fourth Montenegrin Brigades toward Western Bosnia. 
In order to carry out this march through the difficult mountain regions 
of Treskavica, Belasnica and so on, a detailed plan was worked out. 
This plan called for surprise raids from Tarcina Trama on the 
Sarajevo-Mostar line in order to destroy all railway equipment and 
bridges. This operation, which was successfully carried out, resulted 
in the destruction of several trains, all the bridges from Tarcina Trama, 
a kilometer stretch of railway, all stations and about forty locomotives, 
most of which were specially designed for use in the highlands. In 
addition our units occupied the towns of Konjic, Ostrozak and other 
places. The enemy was taken completely by surprise and several hun-
dred enemy soldiers caught in trains were made prisoner. 
The move against this railway was carried out from two directions. 
One column advanced via Iguman (near Sarajevo) and, after complet-
ing its work on the railway, proceeded toward Kresevo, Fojnica and 
Bugojno. The second column advanced toward Konjic and the railway 
station of Bradina. Then, when it had completed its attack on the rail-
way in two days of bloody fighting, this column occupied the strongly 
fortified township of Prozor. After the first column occupied Gornji, 
both columns joined forces for further operations. Yet before our 
arrival, units from Bosanska-Krajina occupied the town of Prijedor 
to ease the situation of encircled Kozara. 
The arrival of these units at Bosanska-Krajina greatly encouraged 
further uprisings not only in Bosanska-Krajina and Dalmatia but also 
in Croatia and Slovenia. With the aid of guerrilla detachments from 
Bosanska-Krajina our units, in addition to occuping Prozor and 
Gornji-Vakuf, also took the towns of Livno, Tomislavgrad, Jajce, 
Mrkonjicgrad and others. The capture of Livno was important, es-
pecially in stimulating a popular uprising in Dalmatia, leading to the 
formation of new brigades and shock groups of guerrilla detachments 
from Krajina, Dalmatia, Lika, Croatia and Slovenia. The People's 
Liberation Army was formed then and the High Command was re-
named the High Command of the People's Army of Liberation and 
Guerrilla Detachments of Yugoslavia. 
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After the occupation of Bihac our troops began to fight their way 
through to Central Bosnia and, after they had liberated a considerable 
part of its territory, occupied Prnjavor, Kotar, Varos, Teslic and other 
towns. This marked the liberation of a considerable part of Central 
Bosnia, almost all of Bosanska-Krajina, part of Dalmatia, almost all 
of Lika, Kordun and the greater part of Slovenia. Incidentally, the 
greatest losses in this offensive were incurred at Kozara. The third 
enemy offensive, concluded in Slovenia, failed because the People's 
Army had so grown in strength and spirit. 
During the autumn of 1942 the High Command sent one of its 
members to Macedonia, there to enlist guerrilla detachments and to 
coordinate operations with Greece and other neighboring countries. 
It also dispatched its chief ' of staff and ten officers to Slovenia to 
organize existing guerrilla detachments into regular units. 
Italian and German Invaders Alarmed 
T HE major successes which the peoples of Yugoslavia had achieved as a result of their superhuman struggle up to the autumn of 1942 
seriously alarmed the Gennan and Italian invaders. As early as Decem-
ber, therefore, they began preparations for their fourth offensive. With 
the object of tightening the ring around our main forces, this fourth 
offensive began with a deep strategic envelopment. This time too, 
as on previous occasions, the enemy directed his main blow at the 
point where our High Command was stationed (a point from which 
the most remotely situated units were under direct control.) The 
Germans concentrated their forces at Karlovac, Glina, Bosanska, 
Kostajnica and Banja-Luka. The Sarajevo concentration of enemy 
forces was effected later, when it was expected that most of our troops 
would be forced out of Bosanska-Krajina into the valley of the Neretva 
and Vrbas Rivers. As in Gospic-Ogulin and Knin and Sinj in Dal-
matia, Italian divisions were concentrated for this offensive. 
As far back as December 1942 we came into possession of docu-
ments revealing that Draja Mihailovich had concluded an agreement 
with the Germans to join forces with them in conducting a fourth 
offensive against us. Throughout Montenegro, Sandjak, Serbia and 
Hercegovina energetic propaganda was conducted among the Chetniks 
to undertake an offensive against Bosanska-Krajina, where the Chetniks 
were to take over power in the towns and villages and to liquidate the 
guerrillas and U stashi. 
The fourth offensive began in January. The Germans advanced 
simultaneously on Karlovac from Slunj, Glina and other points in the 
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Banija area, while the Italians made repeated attempts to break 
through the liberated territory of Lika. The Italians were repulsed 
with heavy losses but, after fifteen days of fighting, the Germans (hurl-
ing great numbers of bombers and assault planes into the battle) suc-
ceeded in occupying the whole of Slunj and all towns as far as Kordun 
and Banija. More than fifty thousand refugees from Kordun and 
Banija who retreated with our troops (who were constantly engaged 
in bloody fighting) were ruthlessly bombed by the German villains. 
The number of victims was very great. 
When the enemy approached Bihac, the High Command moved 
to the Petrovac area. 
There the High Command worked out the following plan: the 
Croatian forces were to remain in their territory in Lika to defend it. 
The Seventh Banja-Luka Division, stationed in the Slunj-Bihac sector, 
was to fight a rearguard action to slow down the enemy's advance in 
liberated territory. The First Bosnian Corps, now transformed into 
the Third Corps, was to harass the enemy's rapid advance in the 
mountainous region of Grmec and Mrkonjicgrad. The First and Third 
Divisions were at that time stationed in Central Bosnia near the Sava 
River and the town of Doboj, and the Second Division in the Livno 
sector in Dalmatia. The High Command decided to concentrate these 
three divisions immediately in a swift maneuver to smash weaker 
enemy garrisons in the valley of the N eretva and Vrbas rivers and to 
straddle the railway line from the Ivan Sedlo mountain pass to the 
town of Mostar, thus enabling our troops to retreat with some 4,000 
wounded soldiers. 
In addition the High Command decided, after the retreat across 
the Neretva River, to undertake a major operation in pursuit of Draja 
Mihailovich's Chetniks and to clear the vile henchmen of the invaders 
out of Montenegro and Sandjak as well as Hercegovina. To the 
Second Division was entrusted the task of launching a swift attack to 
capture the fortified town of Imotski and remaining points and of 
making an immediate thrust into the Neretva Valley near Mostar to 
cut communications between the Italian Command and its garrisons · 
in Prozor, Konjic, Jablanica, Rama, etc. The Third Division was dis-
patched to take the strongly fortified town of Prozor, occupied by the 
Italians a month earlier. One brigade from the First Division was 
ordered to seize the Ivan Sedlo mountain pass, thus cutting the Konjica-
Sarajevo line. Two other brigades from the First Division were ordered 
to defend the road to Bugojno. As a result of uninterrupted marches 
the three divisions reached their destinations in record time. They 
were determined to take Prozor at all costs because it was situated 
along our line of communications. 
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We Foil the Fourth Offensive 
J\ FTER two days of bloody fighting, two brigades from the Third 
r'l. Division occupied the town, and the Italian garrison (about 1,000 
strong) was completely wiped out. Extensive materiel was captured, 
especially supplies of food and ammunition, since the enemy had been 
preparing this town as a base for closing a ring around us as soon as 
the Germans should give the signal. The Second Divisions occupied 
Imotski, liquidated the Italian garrison at Dreznica and rapidly forged 
ahead in the direction of Jablanica, where the Italian regiment was 
stationed. After stiff fighting it captured J ablanica, destroyed almost 
all bridges spanning the N eretva and captured further supplies. The 
Ivan Sedlo mountain pass was also occupied but, owing to the rapid 
intervention of superior German forces, our brigades withdrew in the 
direction of Konjic (which they also failed to occupy during the first 
assault). The Italian Murge Division, which held the entire sector, 
was almost completely destroyed-only a few hundred men survived-
and all its armaments fell into our hands. 
The way had now been cleared for forcing the Neretva River. But 
our units on this sector were tied down by the wounded, who were 
still some hundreds of kilometers from us and who had to be evacuated. 
Under the most difficult conditions of adverse weather and muddy 
roads our trucks constantly carried the wounded to the Prozor sector, 
whence it would be necessary to dispatch them across the Neretva by 
truck as soon as Konjic should fall. The battle that developed in this 
sector lasted 37 days. The Germans rapidly brought up forces. In 
Bugojno the 369th Division, the 36th and units of the 1 1 4th were con-
centrated as well as strong forces of conscripts and Ustashi. The 118th 
Division, swollen by Ustashi and conscripts, was advancing from 
Sarajevo. Across Mount Pren, from Mostar and from Glavaticevo, the 
traitor Draja Mihailovich dispatched over 10,000 Chetniks who, to-
gether with the Italians, were to stab us in the back and block our way. 
But, employing tactics of swift maneuvering along interior lines, we 
fought one of our most glorious battles for liberation there. 
Battles between Donji-Vakuf and Prozor took on a dramatic char-
acter. The Germans had already succeeded in breaking through to a 
point two kilometers away from our wounded. Rapid intervention by 
the heroic Fourth Montenegrin and the Third Krajina Brigades saved 
our wounded. Fighting went on day and night. Our side put into 
action every weapon (such as heavy guns, tanks and other armaments) 
it had captured during the rout of the Italian divisions. In the bitterly 
cold weather prevailing in the mountains the Maklin and Radusa 
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positions changed hands time and time again. Fighting ceaselessly day 
and night, soldiers, especially those of our Seventh Division, were so 
worn out that many died from sheer exhaustion in their forward posi-
,tions. During this time forces of our 'Fourth Montenegrin Brigade 
and units of the Third Division were engaged in constant attacks on 
Konjic, while the greater part of the Third Division was ceaselessly 
engaged in stubborn fighting against Germans and Ustashi in the foot-
hills of Bitovnja. Then, just as our units were occupying a section of 
the town on the left bank of the Neretva River, Draja Mihailovich's 
Chetniks struck our troops. Four of our divisions, along with 4,000 
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wounded, were under attack from all sides. Nevertheless the High 
Command decided to smash the enemy at all costs and to get the 
wounded across the Neretva. After many days of stubborn fighting 
and strong arilltery action on our part, our units crushed the Germans 
in the Gornji-Vakuf sector and sent them reeling back in the direction 
of Bugojno. 
Before our units crossed over to the left bank of the N ere tva the 
High Command issued orders to destroy all remaining bridges across 
the river, despite the fact that we still had to get our wounded and 
the army across. This stratagem, designed to mislead the Germans 
into thinking that we had chosen to make our breach in a different 
direction, succeeded completely. Near the ruined railway bridge all 
our wounded and almost the whole of our army were able to cross 
over. In addition to the four divisions mentioned above, the Ninth 
Dalmatian Division which had retreated from Dalmatia in the face of 
superior enemy forces also crossed over to the left bank. 
The wounded were taken across to the left bank of the N eretva. 
The enemy was crushed at Gornji-Vakuf and needed much time to 
effect reorganization. Completely routed on the left bank of the 
N eretva, the Chetniks and I talians beat a panicky retreat. Since, 
however, we had wrecked all bridges before breaking through, we had 
to destroy all our tanks and heavy guns. 
But pursuit of Draja Mihailovich's Chetniks began immediately. 
Our forces advanced in two directions: toward Nevesinje in Herce-
govina and toward Kalinovnik. In the mountain area near Glavaticevo 
and Kalinovrtik, Mihailovich's Chetniks were again so completely 
smashed as to be rendered incapable of any further resistance. Many 
of them began to desert to our side. Many more in their panic shaved 
their beards and ~hanged into peasant garb to prevent guerrillas 
from identifying them as Chetniks. After forced marches our units 
reached Drina, crossed the river in the face of heavy odds and 
smashed the Italian Taurinense Division on the right bank of the 
Drina. During a swift march N evesin je and Gacko in Hercegovina 
were occupied, while 'in Montenegro our troops got as far as Kolasin. 
A Fifth B low from the Enemy 
T HE month of May was to be a month of rest for our glorious divisions. But while we were busy clearing the Chetniks out of 
Montenegro, the Germans and Italians and Ustashi were already 
preparing for their fifth and most violent offensive against us. Our 
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army countered this fifth offensive under the most difficult of condi-
tions. Several thousand men were recuperating from typhus. , Owing 
to exceptional rigors encountered en route, thousands of our wounded 
were completely exhausted and required a long rest. But the enemy 
gave us no respite and prepared his fifth offensive with the aim of 
destroying us. He was aware of the fact that the High Command and 
our best units were in Montenegro. This time, therefore, taking 
greater pains to prepare his offensive, he dispatched far stronger 
forces against us. 
He transferred some of his divisions from Greece (for example the 
First Alpine Division) to this new campaign and also threw Bulgarians, 
Italians and followers of the puppets Nedich and Pavelich against us. 
The fifth-and likewise the severest-battle began. And again-
though at the cost of tremendous sacrifice-our glorious units inflicted 
tremendous losses on the enemy and emerged without losing their 
fighting capacity. Because the world has already heard much about 
this fifth offensive and much will be written about it in days to come, 
I shall not go into a description of its battles. 
The fourth offensive was followed by our victorious campaign in 
Montenegro which completely liquidated Draja Mihailovich's Chet-
niks. Since that time they have ceased to be of any military importance. 
During both the fourth and the fifth offensives the units which I have 
mentioned bore the main 'brunt of the war. But it was waged against 
a background of fighting throughout much of Yugoslavia. Guerrillas 
and brigades from the sixth Corps in Slavonia harassed enemy com-
munications incessantly. Fighting was also in progress in Slovenia, 
Dalmatia, Serbia and other places. Popular uprisings were spreading 
throughout the whole country. 
Far from intimidating our people and our fighters, the great attacks 
which the troops of occupation launched against the main body of 
our forces had a stimulating effect. Feats of mass heroism performed 
in these battles will buttress our peoples' pride for many centuries 
to come. 
The People Begin to Govern Themselves 
T HE growth of the guerrilla detachments and People's Liberation Armies integrated the power of our people. As early as 1941 
People's Liberation Committees were set up in villages and towns in 
the liberated territories of Serbia, Montenegro, etc: They replaced all 
the old rural and other local administrations which had gone over 
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to the service of the occupation authorities. Originally these com-
mittees had as their principal task the provision of supplies to guerrilla 
detachments but gradually they took over all the duties which rest 
upon local, communal, municipal and district authorities. In the 
autumn of 1942, when the greater part of Yugoslavia had been liber-
ated, the necessity arose for establishing a central political body for all 
Yugoslavia to direct all these committees and to relieve the High 
Command of various political functions which had been constantly 
piling up through the force of circumstance. It was decided to convene 
an Antifascist Vece, or assembly, of the People's Liberation Movement 
of Yugoslavia. It will be remembered that the Vece met on November 
26, 1942, in the town of Bihac and was attended by delegates represent-
ing all the peoples of Yugoslavia. Far-reaching historical decisions 
were adopted and an executive committee was elected. The Vece 
represented all anti-fascist parties and united all political trends, regard-
less of religion and nationality. The Vece was charged with mobilizing 
all means for helping the People's Liberation Army and with con-
tinuing to organize People's Liberation Committees, not only in liber-
ated sectors but in territory still occupied by the enemy. 
In addition to the Anti-fascist Vece of the People's Liberation 
Movement a body with similar functions, known as the Slovenian 
Liberation Front, was set up in Slovenia in 1941. In the spring of 
1941 a regional Anti-fascist Vece was set up in Croatia and in the 
second half of the year regional Anti-fascist Veces of People's Lib-
eration were also set up in Bosnia, Hercegovina, Montenegro, Sandjak, 
etc. Simultaneously throughout Serbia the People's Liberation Com-
mittees organized a regional committee as their central body. The 
difference in names is explained by the fact that because of the mass 
terror maintained by Axis Occup!ltion forces, by the followers of 
Nedich and by :Mihailovich's Chetniks in Serbia, it was impossible to 
hold there general elections for this body. 
On November 29, 1943, the Second Plenary Session of the Anti-
fascist Vece of the People's Liberation Movement, held in the town of 
Jajce, was attended by twenty delegates from all parts of the country. 
This session likewise adopted far-reaching and historic decisions. The 
Anti-fascist Vece was transformed into the supreme legislative body 
of Yugoslavia, with all the rights of a parliament. The presidium was 
elected-with 56 members and with Dr. Ivan Ribar at its head. The 
Yugoslav National Liberation Committee was formed as the provisional 
people's government. 
This Committee decided to annul and reconsider all agreements 
concluded by the refugee Yugoslav Government. It declared invalid 
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any agreement which might be negotiated by that government in 
future and it further decided to forbid the return of King Peter II 
until the question of the monarchy and the over-all system of admin-
istration was finally determined after the war by the free will of the 
people. Finally, it decided that Yugoslavia was to be constituted a 
democratic federated union in which all peoples were to have equal 
rights. Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and 
Hercegovina were considered members of the federation. 
This form of internal organization for Yugoslavia is not an abstract 
ideal but represents a solution based on the will of all Yugoslavs, a 
will tutored by the bitter experience of the past. 
The attack on our country by German, Italian, Bulgarian and 
other invaders marked the beginning not only of the extermination 
of our peoples but also of a campaign of violence fanning up such 
flames of hatred among the various nationalities as to threaten all with 
a general conflagration. Under German instigation the Ustashi killed 
hundreds of thousands of Serbs. Mihailovich's Chetniks, incited by 
Germans and Italians, destroyed tens of thousands of Croats. Our 
people were menaced with unspeakable dangers and faced complete 
destruction. When our Serbian units reached Eastern Bosnia, thou-
sands of bodies of innocent women, children and aged Moslems were 
already resting at the bottom of the Drina River. In Bosnia and 
H ercegovina, particularly in Krajina, we found huge gullies filled 
with the bodies of massacred Serbian women, children and old people. 
We immediately dedicated ourselves to putting an end to this horrible 
carnage. We adopted the slogan, "Fraternity and Unity among the 
Yugoslav Peoples" and exerted every effort to prove to the enraged 
Serbian people and misled Chetniks that not all Croats were villains, 
that not all Moslems were vicious, that only some of those in Ustashi 
uniform were guilty of perpretrating crimes-and that those had been 
committed at the instigation of the Germans. 
We used all the means at our disposal to prove to the unfortunate 
Moslem and Croat population that the villains responsible for these 
crimes were not the Serbs but a handful of Chetniks led by Mihailovich, 
Pechanats and Nedich. This work required tremendous effort on the 
part of our heroic brigades and guerrilla detachments which were 
engaged at the same time in a ruthless struggle against the forces of 
occupation and also against Ustashi and Chetnik criminals-tools in 
the hands of the occupation authorities. In this our efforts were 
crowned with success: as a result of ou.r superhuman struggle, lasting 
unity and brotherhood, such as had never existed before the war, 
have now been established among the peoples of Yugoslavia. Today 
29 
Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Montenegrins, Macedonians and every other 
people are animated by one thought-that of speeding the expulsion 
of the invaders from our country and of preventing the revival of 
anything which in prewar Yugoslavia had contributed to the catas-
trophe; of punishing those chiefly responsible for bringing this terrible 
tragedy down upon our peoples; of building up a truly democratic, 
federated Yugoslavia in which the various peoples of Yugoslavia will 
live in friendship. 
The ' tremendous enthusiasm which spread among the peoples of 
Yugoslavia (both in liberated and occupied areas) after the decisions 
reached at the second session of the Anti-fascist Vece were announced 
indicates that the principle which has guided us throughout our three 
years of war-and which will finally end with the triumph of our 
cause-was sound. It demonstrates, too, that we were justified in 
starting a popular uprising at the very beginning of the war, before 
the enemy was able to put his infernal designs into practice. 
During three months of 1941, with the aid of Ustashi villains, the 
Nazis succeeded in exterminating more than half a million Serbs in 
Croatia, Bosnia, Hercegovina and Vojvodina. 
A Plea for Recognition 
T HOSE who at home and abroad constantly preached that the time was not yet ripe were guilty of a real crime against our people, 
because they sacrificed their countrymen's lives to the murderous sword 
of the invaders. And for more than two years the world was deceived 
about the real state of affairs in Yugoslavia. 
It is easy to understand how this confusion has complicated our 
struggle. Our fighters and the peasants in the villages gnashed their 
teeth when they heard the traitor Draja Mihailovich praised by various 
broadcasting stations and newspapers at the very time when he was 
fighting against us under the command of German officers. Let us 
take but one example, the battle for Konjic in which Mihailovich 
with his 1,800 Chetniks fought on the side of the Germans, Nedich's 
men, Bulgarians, etc. During this period foreign broadcasting stations 
reported that Mihailovich was attacking the enemy from the South, 
thereby helping the guerrillas. It would be hard in all history to find 
a parallel for the injustice thus visited upon our people while they 
were making such sacrifices. 
An end has now been made to this lying deception. The traitor 
Mihailovich, along with Pavelich and Rupnik, has been nailed to the 
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pillory of history. We are thankful to our allies for realizing, although 
belatedly, who it is who is doing the fighting in Yugoslavia and to 
whom aid must be given. 
During three years of superhuman struggle we were called upon 
to fight under conditions for which there is hardly a precedent. A 
small citadel of democracy within Hitler's European Fortress, we are 
under constant attack from overwhelming enemy forces bent upon 
destroying us. But what has frustrated the realization of Hitler's plans? 
First, the unbending will of our peoples and their determination to die 
fighting rather than become slaves of the fascist invaders. Second, 
the profound faith in an Allied victory, brought nearer by the Soviet 
Union. Third, the emergence, in this gigantic and unequal combat, 
of our heroic People's Army of Liberation-an army increasingly 
tempered and seasoned. 
Today we have an army 300,000 strong, equipped with armaments 
captured from the enemy. With Allied aid in armaments we can build 
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up an army of 700,000 to 800,000 men. Working with our Allies, this 
army will deliver the final blow to the German and fascist invaders. 
Today we have our own true People's Government, developed in 
the process of this struggle and elected by popular vote. Our people 
desire-and believe-that the Allies will soon accord official recog-
nition to this government as the only real representative of the Yugo-
slav people. 
Today we have a supreme legislative body, the Anti-fascist Vece 
of the People's Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia. Its task is to 
prepare the reorganization of our country's institutions on the basis of 
truly democratic principles. We also have-and this is our greatest 
achievement-brotherhood and unity among the peoples Gf Yugoslavia. 

